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Abstract—Although federated learning improves privacy of
training data by exchanging model updates rather than raw
data, many research results show that sharing the model updates
may still involve risks. To alleviate this problem, many privacy-
preserving techniques have been introduced to federated learning.
However, considering deep learning models in federated learning,
the resulting schemes either cannot implement non-linear activa-
tion functions well, or cannot remain the same model accuracy
as the original training, or suffer from unaffordable costs. In
this paper, we customize a practical privacy-preserving method
for federated deep learning, which is versatile and applicable
to most state-of-the-art models, such as ResNet and DenseNet.
In particular, this method can support non-linear activation
functions well on the encrypted domain, hence supporting semi-
trusted clients to efficiently train deep neural network locally
over encrypted model iterates (i.e., protecting the privacy of
the model for server-side). Meanwhile, it can be combined
with the secret sharing technique to further ensure the semi-
trusted server cannot obtain local gradients of each client (i.e.,
protect the privacy of training data for client-side). Detailed
security analysis and extensive experiments demonstrate that
the proposed method can achieve privacy-preservation without
sacrificing model accuracy and introducing too much extra costs.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the continued emergence of privacy breaches and data
abuse [34], data privacy and security issues gradually impede
the flourishing development of deep learning [38]. In order
to mitigate the privacy concerns of users, federated learning
(FL) [22] has recently been presented as a promising solution,
where many clients collaboratively train a shared global model
under the orchestration of a central server, while ensuring that
each client’s raw data is stored locally and not exchanged or
transferred. Based on the type of clients, FL is divided into two
settings [15]: the cross-device FL, where clients are mobile or
edge devices, and the cross-silo FL, where clients are relatively
reliable organizations (e.g., medical or financial institutions).
In this paper, we focus on solving the challenges faced in the
cross-silo FL that has received greatly interests recently.
Although FL improves the privacy of local training data by
exchanging model updates (e.g., local gradients or updated
parameters) rather than raw data, from a privacy angle, sharing
§ Equal contribution
BCorresponding author
even the model updates is still a well-known privacy risk [41],
[25]. Thus, many existing researches consider the semi-trusted
security model (i.e., semi-trusted server and/or semi-trusted
clients) and focus on preventing the semi-trusted server and
semi-trusted clients from obtaining local training data and real
model, respectively. Specifically, they mainly adopt existing
privacy-preserving techniques, like differential privacy (DP) [9],
multi-party computation (MPC) [2] or homomorphic encryption
(HE) [28] to support training or predicting on the encrypted or
perturbed model. To the best of our knowledge, these techniques
can be well performed in traditional machine learning, such
as linear regression [38], [26] and k-means [33], to protect
privacy, but cannot elegantly applied in deep learning. More
specifically, for the privacy-preserving deep learning, they face
the following issues [15], [38]:
• The HE-based schemes cannot address non-linear activa-
tion functions well on the encrypted domain;
• The computational and communication costs of the HE
and MPC-based schemes are too high to be applied in
practice;
• The DP-based schemes have to sacrifice the model
accuracy to achieve privacy-preservation.
Therefore, the survey of FL [15] emphasizes that how to
efficiently allow clients to train deep neural networks locally
on encrypted models is still a challenge. Consequently, in this
paper, we customize a practical privacy-preserving method
for federated deep learning, where the main contributions are
two-fold:
1) It addresses the operations of the non-linear activation
functions (like ReLU) and the widely used loss functions
(such as mean squared error and cross-entropy loss
functions) on the encrypted domain, thereby supporting
clients to train deep model locally without knowing true
model updates or accessing the true model predictions
(i.e., protect the privacy of the server-side). Besides, it can
be further combined with the secret sharing technique to
ensure the semi-trusted server cannot obtain local gradients
of each client, thereby protecting the privacy of both server
and client sides.
2) It theoretically ensures that the server can accurately
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recover model updates, meanwhile, after pretraining
clients can use encrypted models to get true predictions.
Besides, it provides a trade-off between model privacy and
efficiency. For the most efficient case, the upper limit for
extra computational and communication costs are constant
times the original ones, which ensures the efficiency
and usability of our method in practice. Furthermore,
extensive experiments conducted on real-world data also
demonstrate the accuracy and the efficiency of our method.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we first outline the concept of cross-silo FL
and the Hadamard product. After that, we state the system
model, threat model and design goals.
A. The Cross-Silo FL
In the cross-silo FL [15], clients are different organizations
(e.g. medical or financial), the network connection is relatively
stable and the network bandwidth is relatively large. That is,
all clients are always available and can afford relatively large
communication cost. Thus, the cross-silo FL allows all clients
to join each iteration.
Formally, consider the FL with K clients, where the k-
th client has the local training dataset Dk = {(xi, y¯i)}Nki=1,
xi = (xi1, . . . , xid)
T and y¯i = (y¯i1, . . . , y¯ic)T are the feature
vector and the ground-truth label vector, respectively. Thus, the
cross-silo FL aims to solving an optimization problem [22],
[20]:
min
W
F (W ) ,
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
Fk(W ), (1)
where W is the model parameter, N is the total sample size
such that N =
∑K
k=1Nk, and Fk(W ) is the local object of
the k-th client such that
Fk(W ) ,
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
L (W ; (xi, y¯i)) , (2)
where L (·; ·) is the specific loss function, like the mean square
error loss function or cross entropy loss function.
In general, this optimization problem can be handled with
stochastic gradient descent (SGD). Thus, each client first
computes local gradients by adopting the SGD technique and
returns them to the server for aggregation and updating
Wt+1 ←Wt − η
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
∇Fk(Wt), (3)
where ∇Fk(Wt) is the local gradient on local data of k-th
client at the current model Wt, and η is the learning rate.
B. Hadamard Product
The Hadamard product [13] takes two matrices of the same
dimensions and produces another matrix of the same dimension
as the operands.
Definition 1. For two matrices A and B of the same dimension
m× n, the Hadamard product A ◦B (or AB) is a matrix
of the same dimension as the operands, with elements given by
(A ◦B)ij = (AB)ij = (A)ij(B)ij
Besides, two properties of Hadamard product used in our
scheme are given as follows:
• For any two matrices A and B, and a diagonal matrix D,
we have {
D(A ◦B) = (DA) ◦B.
(A ◦B)D = (AD) ◦B. (4)
• For any two column vectors a and b, the corresponding
Hadamard product is: a ◦ b = Dab,, where Da is the
corresponding diagonal matrix with the vector a as its
main diagonal.
C. Problem Statement
In this part, we introduce the system and threat models
considered in this paper, and identify our design goals.
1) System Model: As shown in Fig. 1, our system model
mainly includes two components: a server and a number of
clients, where the corresponding roles are described as follows:
• The Server is responsible for initializing the model and
assisting clients in training the global model. Particularly,
in order to protect the privacy, the server sends the noisy
models to clients for training.
• Clients have their own local training data and want to
collaboratively train a global model. Specifically, each
client computes local gradients with their own data and
the noisy model received from the server, and then returns
noisy local gradients to the server for aggregating and
updating.
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Fig. 1: System architecture of the proposed scheme.
2) Threat Model and Design Goals: Similar to [15], we
assume the server and clients are honest-but-curious [12], [28],
which means that they honestly follow the underlying scheme,
but attempt to infer other entities’ data privacy independently.
Consequently, the design goals of our method mainly include
the following three aspects:
• Functionality: Each client can train models locally on
the noisy model, meanwhile, the server can recover the
exact model updates.
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• Confidentiality: The proposed method should ensure the
confidentiality of both the server and every client. On the
one hand, clients cannot know true model updates and
prediction, as well as the well-trained model parameters.
On the other hand, the server cannot obtain local gradients
of individual client from the received information.
• Efficiency: The proposed method should minimize ex-
tra computation and communication overhead without
reducing model accuracy.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we introduce our method, which mainly
includes four parts: parameter perturbation, noisy gradient
computation, model update and data inference. The overall
framework is described as follows:
• Model training: In our privacy-preserving federated deep
learning, the model training mainly includes the following
three phases:
1) The server encrypts the global model iterates with one-
time random numbers and then sends it to each clients
for local training, which is described in Section III-A.
2) Each client first trains the local model with local training
data and the received encrypted model iterates to get
local gradients. Then, the client perturbs local gradients
with one-time random numbers that satisfy the condition
that the sum of all clients’ random numbers is zero,
and returns the perturbed local gradients to the server.
The details are shown in Section III-B.
3) The server updates the current global model based on
the received local gradients from all clients, which is
introduced in Section III-C.
The server and all clients interactively iterate the processes
in Sections III-A-III-C until the convergence. Conse-
quently, the server obtains well-trained model.
• Data inference: The server encrypts the well-trained model
and sends it to all clients for data inference, which is given
in Section III-D.
A. Parameter Perturbation
The parameter perturbation is performed by the server, which
takes model parameters W and random noises R as inputs, and
outputs noisy model parameters Ŵ 1. In order to facilitate the
understanding of our encryption method, we give a simple
case of multiple layer perceptron (MLP) with ReLU non-
linear activation. Then, we show this method can be easily
applied on the state-of-the-art models such as ResNet[11] and
DenseNet[14].
1) Multiple Layer Perceptron: Consider an MLP with L
layers, where the parameter and the output of the l-th layer
are denoted as W (l) ∈ Rnl×nl−1 and y(l) ∈ Rnl , respectively,
1 In the rest of the paper, the notations with the symbol “ ˆ ” indicate the
parameters that are affected by the noise, e.g., Ŵ , yˆ(l).
and nl is the number of neurons in the l-th layer. Specifically,
y(l) is computed as
y(l) =
ReLU
(
W (l)y(l−1)
)
, for 1 ≤ l ≤ L− 1.
W (l)y(l−1), for l = L.
(5)
where ReLU(·) is the operation of ReLU non-linear activation.
Note that when l = 1, then y(0) is the input of neural network
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xd)
T .
1. Parameter encryption. In order to protect the privacy of
model parameters W = {W (l)}Ll=1, the server needs to encrypt
or perturb them before distributing. Specifically, the parameter
encryption consists of the following two steps:
• Key selection: The server randomly selects the multiplica-
tive noisy vector r(l) ∈ Rnl>0 for 1 ≤ l ≤ L − 1, the
additive noisy vectors γ, ra ∈ RnL with ra has pairwise
different components and there is a partition unionsqms=1{Is} of
{1, 2, . . . , nL} (that is ∪ms=1Is = {1, 2, . . . , nL} and for
any i 6= j, Ii ∩ Ij = ∅), such that for any i, j in the same
Is satisfy that γi = γj . Denote γIs := γi (i ∈ Is). The
private key is ({r(l)}Ll=1, {γIs}ms=1).
• Parameter encryption: For model parameters W (l), the
server computes
Ŵ (l) =
{
R(l) ◦W (l), for 1 ≤ l ≤ L− 1;
R(l) ◦W (l) +Ra, for l = L, (6)
where R(l) ∈ Rnl×nl−1 and Ra ∈ RnL×nL−1 satisfy
R
(l)
ij =

r
(1)
i , when l = 1
r
(l)
i /r
(l−1)
j , when 2 ≤ l ≤ L− 1
1/r
(L−1)
j , when l = L
(7)
Raij = γi · ra,i, (8)
where i ∈ [1, nl] and j ∈ [1, nl−1] in Eq. (7), and i ∈
[1, nL] and j ∈ [1, nL−1] in Eq. (8).
Finally, the server sends Ŵ = {Ŵ (l)}Ll=1 together with ra
to each client for local training.
2. Forward propagation. In order to facilitate the under-
standing of our parameter perturbation method, we introduce
the forward propagation in advance. According to Eq. (5),
each client computes the noisy output yˆ = {yˆ(l)}Ll=1 with the
received Ŵ and the sample (x, y¯), i.e.,
yˆ(l) =
ReLU
(
Ŵ (l)yˆ(l−1)
)
, for 1 ≤ l ≤ L− 1.
Ŵ (l)yˆ(l−1), for l = L.
(9)
Lemma 1 shows the important relations between the noisy
outputs and the true outputs.
Lemma 1. For any 1 ≤ l ≤ L, the noisy output vector yˆ(l)
and the true output vector y(l) have the following relationships
yˆ(l) =r(l) ◦ y(l), when 1 ≤ l ≤ L− 1. (10)
yˆ(L) =y(L) + αγ ◦ ra = y(L) + αr. (11)
where α =
∑nL−1
j=1 yˆ
(L−1)
j and r = γ ◦ ra.
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Proof. Based on Eq. (7), we can deduce that
R(1) = Dr(1)E
(1),
R(l)Dr(l−1) = r
(l)E(l), for 2 ≤ l ≤ L− 1,
R(L)Dr(L−1) = E
(L).
where E(l) is the nl × nl−1 matrix whose entries are all 1s.
First, we prove Eq. (10) by induction. When l = 1, we can
obtain that
yˆ(1) = ReLU
(
Ŵ (1)x
)
= ReLU
((
R(1) ◦W (1)
)
x
)
= ReLU
((
Dr(1)E
(1) ◦W (1)
)
x
)
= ReLU
(
Dr(1)W
(1)x
)
= ReLU
(
r(1) ◦ (W (1)x)
)
(a)
= r(1) ◦ReLU(W (1)x) = r(1) ◦ y(1),
where (a) follows from the condition r(1) ∈ Rn1>0.
Then, for 2 ≤ l ≤ L− 1, assuming yˆ(l−1) = r(l−1) ◦y(l−1)
by induction, we have
yˆ(l) = ReLU
(
Ŵ (l)yˆ(l−1)
)
= ReLU
((
R(l) ◦W (l))(r(l−1) ◦ y(l−1)))
= ReLU
((
R(l) ◦W (l))Dr(l−1)y(l−1))
= ReLU
((
(R(l)Dr(l−1)) ◦W (l)
)
y(l−1)
)
= ReLU
((
Dr(l)E
(l) ◦W (l))y(l−1))
= ReLU
(
Dr(l)W
(l)y(l−1)
)
= ReLU
(
r(l) ◦ (W (l)y(l−1))
)
= r(l) ◦ y(l).
Thus the Eq. (10) is proved. Furthermore, we have
yˆ(L) = Ŵ (L)yˆ(L−1) = (R(L) ◦W (L−1) +Ra)yˆ(L−1)
= (R(L) ◦W (l))(r(L−1) ◦ y(L−1)) +Rayˆ(L−1)
= (R(L)Dr(L−1)) ◦W (L)y(L−1)) +Rayˆ(L−1)
= (E(L) ◦W (L))y(L−1) +Rayˆ(L−1)
= W (L)y(L−1) +Rayˆ(L−1)
= y(L) + αγ ◦ ra = y(L) + αr.
2) Convolutional Neural Networks: Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNN) have proven to be effective in many computer
vision and natural language processing tasks. In this section,
we continue to demonstrate how to apply our encryption
method to CNNs. Although convolution operation can be
applied to any dimensional input, we focus on 3-dimensional
inputs since we are most concerned about image data. For any
input I(l) ∈ Rcl×hl×wl , where cl, wl and hl are the number
of channels, weight and height, respectively, the convolution
operation, denoted by I(l+1) = I(l) ∗W (l), is defined as
I
(l+1)
k,i,j =
cl∑
c′=1
f∑
i′=1
f∑
j′=1
W
(l)
k,c′,i′,j′I
(l)
c′,i+i′,j+j′ (12)
where W (l+1) ∈ Rcl+1×cl×f×f is a set of cl+1 filters with
each filter of shape cl × f × f , and I(l+1) ∈ Rcl+1×hl+1×wl+1
is the output image.
From the above, convolutional layer can be implemented with
a convolution operation followed by a non-linear function, and a
CNN can be constructed by interweaving several convolutoinal
and spatial pooling layers. At last, the CNN ends with a
fully-connected layer for regression or classification tasks. In
order to apply our encryption method to CNNs, we choose
ReLU as the non-linear function and MaxPooling as the
spatial pooling layer. In fact, [21] proved the equivalence of
convolutional and fully connected operations. Therefore, the
multiplicative noise introduced for MLP will not affect the
operation of convolutional layers, which can be adopted with
small alteration.
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Fig. 2: Common connections in neural networks. ⊕ can
be element-wise summation, element-wise multiplication or
concatenation. In this paper we choose concatenation.
Section III-A1 mainly discusses about the “one-path” con-
nection, i.e., the input of l-th layer is exactly the output of
(l−1)-th layer. Most state-of-the-art CNN models, e.g., ResNet
[11] and DenseNet [14], however, utilize residual connections
in their structures, i.e., the l-th layer takes the output of the
multiple precedent layers as input, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
There are various kind of residual connections, for simplicity,
we choose to connect the precedent outputs over the channel
dimension.
1. Parameter encryption. Similar to Section III-A1, the
parameter encryption consists of the following two steps:
• Key selection: The server randomly selects the multiplica-
tive noisy vector r(l) ∈ Rcl>0 for 1 ≤ l ≤ L − 1, the
additive noisy vectors γ, ra ∈ RnL with ra has pairwise
different components and the components of γ may not be
independent. Similar to the MLP, the parameter γ satisfies
that for any i, j in the same Is, γi = γj . The private key
is ({r(l)}Ll=1, {γIs}ms=1).
• Parameter encryption: For the current model parameter
W (l), the server computes
Ŵ (l) =
{
R(l) ◦W (l), for 1 ≤ l ≤ L− 1,
R(l) ◦W (l) +Ra, for l = L, (13)
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where R(l) ∈ Rcl×cl−1×f×f satisfies
R
(l)
k,c′,i′,j′ =
{
r
(l)
k , when l = 1,
r
(l)
k /r
(l,in)
c′ when 2 ≤ l ≤ L− 1.
(14)
Note that k ∈ [1, cl], c′ ∈ [1, cl−1] i′ ∈ [1, f ] and j′ ∈
[1, f ]. r(l,in) =
(
r(m)
)
m∈P (l) is the concatenate vector
of all vectors r(m) for m ∈ P (l), and P (l) denotes the
set of layers connected with the l-th layer.
Besides, RL, Ra ∈ RnL×(cL−1hL−1wL−1) satisfy
R
(L)
ij = 1/r
(L−1)
bj/(hL−1wL−1)c (15)
Raij = γi · ra,i, (16)
where i ∈ [1, nL] and j ∈ [1, nL−1].
It is worth noting that compared with the noisy vector of MLP,
we can ignore the spatial dimensions (i.e., height and width)
and just impose the same noisy value on them.
2. Forward propagation. Similar to the MLP, each client
computes the noisy output of each layer based on Eq.(12), and
the relation between the noisy outputs and true outputs is given
in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. For CNN, the noisy outputs and true outputs satisfy
the following relation:
• For the l-th layer, the corresponding noisy output Iˆ(l)k is
a matrix for the k-th channel, where each element in Iˆ(l)k
is represented as
Iˆ
(l)
k,i′,j′ = r
(l)
k I
(l)
k,i′,j′ , for l = 1, 2, . . . , L− 1. (17)
• For the last fully connected layer, the final noisy prediction
vector yˆ(L) is computed as
yˆ(L) = y(L) + αγ ◦ ra = y(L) + αr, (18)
where α =
∑nL−1
j=1 Flatten(Iˆ
(L−1))j , and the
Flatten(Iˆ(L−1)) means expanding Iˆ(L−1) into a
vector along the channel, height and width dimensions,
which implies nL−1 = cL−1hL−1wL−1.
Proof. As defined in Section III-A2, the convolutional layer is
implemented as a convolution operation followed by a ReLU.
Due to the existence of residual connection, the l-th layer may
be connected to a set of preceding layers, denoted as P (l).
Obviously, the input of the l-th convolutional layer, denoted as
I(l,in) ∈ Rcl,in×hl,in×wl,in , is the concatenation of the output
of layers in set P (l) along the channel dimension, which can
be represented as
I(l,in) =
[
I
(m)
1,i,j ; I
(m)
2,i,j ; . . . ; I
(m)
cm,i,j
]
m∈P (l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Concatenation along the channel dimension
.
Therefore, the output of the l-th convolutional layer I(l) ∈
Rcl×hl×wl is defined as:
I
(l)
k,i,j = ReLU
cl,in∑
c′=1
f∑
i′=1
f∑
j′=1
W
(l)
k,c′,i′,j′I
(l,in)
c′,i+i′,j+j′

= ReLU
 ∑
c′ ,i′ ,j′
W
(l)
k,c′,i′,j′I
(l,in)
c′,i+i′,j+j′
 ,
where W (l) ∈ Rcl×cl,in×f×f is the parameter of the l-th layer.
In what follows, we prove Eq. (17) by induction:
• When l = 1, we have
Iˆ
(1)
k,i,j = ReLU
 ∑
c′ ,i′ ,j′
Ŵ
(1)
k,c′,i′,j′I
(1,in)
c′,i+i′,j+j′

= ReLU
 ∑
c′ ,i′ ,j′
R
(1)
k,c′,i′,j′W
(1)
k,c′,i′,j′I
(1,in)
c′,i+i′,j+j′

= ReLU
 ∑
c′ ,i′ ,j′
r
(1)
k W
(1)
k,c′,i′,j′I
(1,in)
c′,i+i′,j+j′

= r
(1)
k ReLU
 ∑
c′ ,i′ ,j′
W
(1)
k,c′,i′,j′I
(1,in)
c′,i+i′,j+j′

= r
(1)
k I
(1)
k,i,j .
• Then, for 2 ≤ l ≤ L − 1, assuming we have Iˆ(h)k,i,j =
r
(h)
k I
(h)
k,i,j , h = 1, 2, ..., l − 1 by induction. Obviously, by
the definition of I(l,in) (Iˆ(l,in)), we can deduce that
Iˆ
(l,in)
k,i,j = r
(l,in)
k I
(l,in)
k,i,j .
Then the noisy output of the l-th layer is given as
Iˆ
(l)
k,i,j = ReLU
 ∑
c
′
,i
′
,j
′
Ŵ
(l)
k,c′,i′,j′ Iˆ
(l,in)
c′,i+i′,j+j′

= ReLU
 ∑
c
′
,i
′
,j
′
R
(l)
k,c′,i′,j′W
(l)
k,c′,i′,j′r
(l,in)
c′ I
(l,in)
c′,i+i′,j+j′

= ReLU
 ∑
c
′
,i
′
,j
′
r
(l)
k
r
(l,in)
c′
r
(l,in)
c′ W
(l)
k,c′,i′,j′I
(l,in)
c′,i+i′,j+j′

= r
(l)
k ReLU
cl,in∑
c
′
=1
f∑
i
′
=1
f∑
j
′
=1
W
(l)
k,c′,i′,j′I
(l,in)
c′,i+i′,j+j′

= r
(l)
k I
(l)
k,i,j .
Next, we prove the correctness of Eq. (18). More specifically,
let a vector y(l) ∈ Rclhlwl be the flatten result of I(l), i.e.,
y
(l)
kij = I
(l)
k,i,j . Based on Eq. (17), we have
yˆ
(L−1)
kij = Iˆ
(L−1)
k,i,j = r
(L−1)
k I
(L−1)
k,i,j = r
(L−1)
k y
(L−1)
kij .
Denote nl = clhlwl, then the output of last fully connected
layer yˆ(L)i , where i = 1, 2, . . . , nL, can be computed as
yˆ
(L)
i =
nL−1∑
j=1
Ŵ
(L)
ij yˆ
(L−1)
j
=
nL−1∑
j=1
(
R
(L)
ij W
(L)
ij +R
a
ij
)
r
(L−1)
bj/(hL−1wL−1)cy
(L−1)
j
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=nL−1∑
j=1
(
R
(L)
ij W
(L)
ij r
(L−1)
bj/(hL−1wL−1)cy
(L−1)
j +R
a
ij yˆ
(L−1)
j
)
=
nL−1∑
j=1
(
1/r
(L−1)
bj/(hL−1wL−1)cW
(L)
ij r
(L−1)
bj/(hL−1wL−1)cy
(L−1)
j
)
+
nL−1∑
j=1
(
γira,iyˆ
(L−1)
j
)
=
nL−1∑
j=1
W
(L)
ij y
(L−1)
j + γira,i
nL−1∑
j=1
yˆ
(L−1)
j
= y
(L)
i + αri,
which implies that yˆ(L) = y(L) + αγ ◦ ra = y(L) + αr.
B. Noisy Gradient Computation
Generally, the local training performed by each client
includes the forward and backward propagation. Since the
forward propagation is introduced in Section III-A, we just
show the backward propagation here. Note that the derivations
given in the following contents can be applied in both MLP
and CNN. After computing local gradients, clients perturb
them with the secret sharing technique to guarantee that the
semi-trusted server can only recover the aggregated gradients
rather than individual local gradients.
1) Backward propagation: After obtain the noisy outputs
of each layer in forward propagation process, i.e., yˆ(l) for l =
1, 2, . . . , L, the client calculates the corresponding gradients
based on the specific loss function. Specifically, we first use
the Mean Squared Error (MSE) loss function as the basis and
then show the case of the Cross-Entropy (CE) loss function.
(a) The case of MSE: Considering our encrypted model,
for each sample (x, y¯), from Lemma 1, the noisy MSE is
L̂ = 1
2
nL∑
i=1
(
yˆ
(L)
i − y¯i
)2
=
1
2
nL∑
i=1
(
y
(L)
i − y¯i + αri
)2
.
In what follows, Lemma 3 shows the relation between the
noisy gradients and the true gradients.
Lemma 3. For any 1 ≤ l ≤ L, the noisy gradient matrix
∂L̂
∂Ŵ (l)
and the true gradient matrix ∂L
∂W (l)
satisfy
∂L̂
∂Ŵ (l)
=
1
R(l)
◦ ∂L
∂W (l)
+ rTσ(l) − υβ(l), (19)
where σ(l) =
(
α ∂yˆ
(L)
∂Ŵ (l)
+ ( ∂Lˆ
∂yˆ(L)
)T ∂α
∂Ŵ (l)
)
, υ = rTr and
β(l) = α ∂α
∂Ŵ (l)
.
Proof. Based on the noisy MSE, we have
∂L̂
∂yˆ(L)
= (yˆ(L) − y¯)T = ∂L
∂y(L)
+ αrT ,
Thus, we can derive that
∂L̂
∂Ŵ (l)
=
∂L̂
∂yˆ(L)
∂yˆ(L)
∂Ŵ (l)
=
(
∂L
∂y(L)
+ αrT
)
∂yˆ(L)
∂Ŵ (l)
=
∂L
∂y(L)
(
∂y(L)
∂Ŵ (l)
+
∂(αr)
∂Ŵ (l)
)
+ αrT
∂yˆ(L)
∂Ŵ (l)
=
∂L
∂Ŵ (l)
+
(
∂L̂
∂yˆ(L)
− αrT
)
∂(αr)
∂Ŵ (l)
+ αrT
∂yˆ(L)
∂Ŵ (l)
=
∂L
∂Ŵ (l)
+ rT
α ∂yˆ(L)
∂Ŵ (l)
+
(
∂L̂
∂yˆ(L)
)T
∂α
∂Ŵ (l)

−υα ∂α
∂Ŵ (l)
=
1
R(l)
◦ ∂L
∂W (l)
+ rTσ(l) − υβ(l).
Note that σ(l) and β(l) can be computed directly by the
clients. For all samples in a mini-batch dataset Dtk ∈ Dk, the
k-th client computes the average gradients and the noisy items:
∇Ŵ (l) = 1|Dtk|
∑
n∈Dtk
∂L̂n
∂Ŵ (l)
;
σ(l) =
1
|Dtk|
∑
n∈Dtk
σ(l)n ;
β(l) =
1
|Dtk|
∑
n∈Dtk
β(l)n .
(b) The case of CE: Since the CE loss is widely adopted for
classification tasks, we discuss how to incorporate CE loss into
our method with one additional round of interaction between
the server and clients. Similarly, for each sample (x, y¯), from
Lemma 1, the form of noisy CE is
L̂ = −
nL∑
i=1
y¯i log
exp(yˆ
(L)
i )∑nL
j=1 exp(yˆ
(L)
j )
. (20)
Lemma 4 shows the gradient of CE loss w.r.t the final output
of models.
Lemma 4. The gradient of cross entropy loss L =
−∑nLi=1 y¯i log exp(y(L)i )∑nL
j=1 exp(y
(L)
j )
w.r.t the final output of the model
y(L) can be derived as
∂L
∂y
(L)
i
=
exp(y
(L)
i )∑nL
j=1 exp(y
(L)
j )
− y¯i. (21)
Proof. The cross-entropy loss L can be deduced as
L = −
nL∑
i=1
y¯i log
exp(y
(L)
i )∑nL
j=1 exp(y
(L)
j )
= (
nL∑
i=1
y¯i) log(
nL∑
j=1
exp(y
(L)
j ))−
nL∑
i=1
y¯iy
(L)
i
= log(
nL∑
j=1
exp(y
(L)
j ))−
nL∑
i=1
y¯iy
(L)
i .
Thus, we have
∂L
∂y
(L)
i
=
∂ log(
∑nL
j=1 exp(y
(L)
j ))
∂y
(L)
i
− y¯i
=
exp(y
(L)
i )∑nL
j=1 exp(y
(L)
j )
− y¯i.
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From Lemma 4, the noisy gradient of the noisy loss function
Eq. (20) is computed as:
∂L̂
∂yˆ
(L)
i
=
exp(yˆ
(L)
i )∑nL
j=1 exp(yˆ
(L)
j )
− y¯i
=
exp(y
(L)
i + αri)∑nL
j=1 exp(y
(L)
j + αrj)
− y¯i. (22)
Due to the complexity of Eq. (22), if the client directly
returns the noisy gradients, the server cannot extract the true
gradients even though it knows the private key. Thus, in order
to help the server to obtain the true gradients, an interactive
protocol between the client and the server needs to be conducted
before performing the process of the backward propagation.
More specifically, the corresponding interactive protocol is
introduced as follows:
(1) Client → Server: For each class i, the client selects a
random number λi and computes µij =
exp(y
(L)
j +rjα)
exp(y
(L)
i +riα)
+λi
for j = 1, 2, . . . , nL and j 6= i. Then, the client sends
{µij}nLj=1,j 6=i and α to the server.
(2) Server→ Client: After receiving {µij}nLj=1,j 6=i, the server
first computes:
µij · exp(r∗ij)
=
exp
(
y
(L)
j + rjα
)
exp
(
y
(L)
i + riα
) + λi
 exp(r∗ij)
=
exp
(
y
(L)
j
)
exp
(
y
(L)
i
) · exp((rj − ri)α+ r∗ij) + λ exp(r∗ij)
=
exp(y
(L)
j )
exp(y
(L)
i )
· exp(δi) + λi exp(r∗ij), (23)
where j = 1, 2, . . . , nL and j 6= i. Given δi randomly
selected by the server, the random number r∗ij should
satisfy (rj − ri)α + r∗ij = δi for j = 1, 2, . . . , nL and
j 6= i. Then, the server computes:
yˆ′i = exp(δi) +
nL∑
j=1,j 6=i
µij · exp(r∗ij)
= exp(δi) +
nL∑
j=1,j 6=i
(exp(y(L)j )
exp(y
(L)
i )
· exp(δi) +
λi exp(r
∗
ij)
)
= exp(δi)
1 + nL∑
j=1,j 6=i
exp(y
(L)
j )
exp(y
(L)
i )
+
λi
nL∑
j=1,j 6=i
exp(r∗ij)
= exp(δi)
∑nL
j=1 exp(y
(L)
j )
exp(y
(L)
i )
+ λi
nL∑
j=1,j 6=i
exp(r∗ij).
Finally, the server generates a random vector ξ ∈ RnL ,
which satisfies that for any i, j in the same Is, we have ξi =
ξj (Recall that unionsqms=1{Is} is a partition of {1, 2, . . . , nL},
and we denote ξIs = ξi for i ∈ Is). Then the server
returns yˆ′i,
ξi
1−exp(δi) together with
∑nL
j=1,j 6=i exp(r
∗
ij) to
the client.
After receiving yˆ′i,
1−exp(δi)
ξi
and
∑nL
j=1,j 6=i exp(r
∗
ij), the
client uses the random number λi to compute
yˆ∗i =
1
yˆ′i − λi
∑nL
j=1,j 6=i exp(r
∗
ij)
=
1
exp(δi)
∑nL
j=1 exp(y
(L)
j )
exp(y
(L)
i )
=
1
exp(δi)
· exp(y
(L)
i )∑nL
j=1 exp(y
(L)
j )
. (24)
Let exp (δ) = (exp (δ1), exp (δ2), ..., exp (δnL)). Then the
client reconstruct the noisy gradient as
∇Ŵ (l) = (yˆ∗ − y¯)T ∂yˆ
(L)
∂Ŵ (l)
. (25)
Then, Lemma 5 shows the relationship between the recon-
structed noisy gradients and true gradients.
Lemma 5. For any 1 ≤ l ≤ L, the noisy gradient matrix
∇Ŵ (l) and the true gradient matrix ∂L
∂W (l)
satisfy
∇Ŵ (l) = 1
R(l)
◦ ∂L
∂W (l)
+ rTσ(l) − (rT ◦ ξT )β(l) + ξTψ(l),
(26)
where σ(l) =
(
(yˆ∗ − y¯) ∂α
∂Ŵ (l)
)
, β(l) = y˜∗ ∂α
∂Ŵ (l)
,ψ(l) =
Dy˜∗T
∂yˆ(L)
∂Ŵ (l)
, and y˜∗ := yˆ∗ ◦ ( 1−exp (δ)ξ ).
Proof. From Eq.(24) and Lemma 4, we have
yˆ∗ − y¯ = 1
exp (δ)
◦ exp(y
(L))∑nL
j=1 exp(y
(L)
j )
− y¯
=
(
exp(y(L))∑nL
j=1 exp(y
(L)
j )
− y¯
)
+
(
1
exp (δ)
− 1
)
◦ exp
(
y(L)
)∑nL
j=1 exp
(
y
(L)
j
)
=
(
∂L
∂y(L)
)T
+ ξ ◦ y˜∗.
Then, we can obtain
∇Ŵ (l) = (yˆ∗ − y¯)T ∂yˆ
(L)
∂Ŵ (l)
=
(
(
∂L
∂y(L)
)T + ξ ◦ y˜∗
)T (
∂y(L)
∂Ŵ (l)
+
∂(αr)
∂Ŵ (l)
)
=
1
R(l)
◦ ∂L
∂W (l)
+ rT
(
(yˆ∗ − y¯) ∂α
∂Ŵ (l)
)
−(rT ◦ ξT )
(
y˜∗
∂α
∂Ŵ (l)
)
+ ξTDy˜∗
∂yˆ(L)
∂Ŵ (l)
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=
1
R(l)
◦ ∂L
∂W (l)
+ rTσ(l) − (rT ◦ ξT )β(l) + ξTψ(l),
where the third equality from the fact that (ξT ◦y˜∗T )r = rT (ξ◦y˜∗) =
rTDξy˜
∗ = (rT ◦ ξT )y˜∗ and ξT ◦ y˜∗T = ξTDy˜∗T .
Similarly, σ(l), β(l) and ψ(l) can be computed directly by
the clients. For all samples in a mini-batch dataset Dtk ∈ Dk,
the k-th client computes the average gradients and the noisy
items: 
∇Ŵ (l) = 1|Dtk|
∑
n∈Dtk
∇Ŵ (l)n ;
σ(l) =
1
|Dtk|
∑
n∈Dtk
σ(l)n ;
β(l) =
1
|Dtk|
∑
n∈Dtk
β(l)n ;
ψ(l) =
1
|Dtk|
∑
n∈Dtk
ψ(l)n .
2) Local gradients perturbation: First, all K clients consult
with a set of random number matrices
{
φ
(l)
1 ,φ
(l)
2 , . . . ,φ
(l)
K
}
such that
∑K
k=1Nkφ
(l)
k = 0nl×nl−1 for l = 1, 2, . . . , L, which
are unknown to the server. Without loss of generality, we
assume the k-th client holds {φ(l)k }Ll=1. Note that for different
iteration, clients can consult with a different set of random
matrices. After each client k computes the noisy local gradients{(
∇Ŵ (l)
)}L
l=1
as well as noisy terms ({σ(l)k ,β(l)k }Ll=1 for
MSE and {σ(l)k ,β(l)k ,ψ(l)k }Ll=1 for CE), the k-th client masks
them with the secret parameter φ(l)k as:
∇F̂k(Ŵ (l)) =
(
∇Ŵ (l)
)
k
+ φ
(l)
k ,
σ̂
(l)
k = σ
(l)
k + φ
(l)
k ,
β̂
(l)
k = β
(l)
k + φ
(l)
k ,
ψ̂
(l)
k = ψ
(l)
k + φ
(l)
k (for the case of CE).
(27)
where φ(l)k used for computing ∇F̂k(Ŵ (l)), σ̂(l)k , β̂(l)k and ψ̂(l)k
can be different, for simplicity, we do not use other symbols
to distinguish.
Finally, the k-th client returns the perturbed gradients
together with the additional noisy terms to the server:
• For MSE, the k-th client returns {∇F̂k(Ŵ (l))}Ll=1 and
(m + 1) noisy terms {σ˜(l)k,1, σ˜(l)k,2, · · · , σ˜(l)k,m, β̂(l)k }Ll=1 to
the server, where σ˜(l)k,s = r
T
a,Is
σ̂
(l)
k|Is
for s = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
• For CE, the k-th client returns {∇F̂k(Ŵ (l))}Ll=1 and 3m
noisy terms {σ˜(l)k,1, σ˜(l)k,2, · · · , σ˜(l)k,m, β˜(l)k,1, β˜(l)k,2, · · · , β˜(l)k,m,
ψ˜
(l)
k,1, ψ˜
(l)
k,2, · · · , ψ˜(l)k,m}Ll=1 to the server, where β˜(l)k,s =
rTa,Is β̂
(l)
k|Is
and ψ˜(l)k,s = 1
T
Is
ψ̂
(l)
k|Is
for s = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Note that 1Is is denoted as the all 1’s vector of length |Is|. For
the additive noisy vector ra, we denote ra,Is the restriction
of ra on Is. For any c × n matrix M , we denote M|Is the
sub-matrix of M consists of the rows indexed by Is.
C. Model Update
After receiving the noisy local gradients from all clients, the
server first needs to aggregate received data from all clients,
and then recover the exact model updates for the next iteration
(i.e., (t+ 1)-th iteration). Specifically, the server performs the
following operations.
1) The case of MSE: The server aggregates the received
messages as follows:
∇F̂ (Ŵ (l)) =
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
∇F̂k(Ŵ (l)),
σ˜(l)s =
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
σ˜
(l)
k,s, s = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
β̂(l) =
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
β̂
(l)
k .
(28)
where l = 1, 2, . . . , L. Then, according to Lemma 3, the server
recovers the true aggregated gradients ∇F (W (l)) as follows:
for l = 1, 2, . . . , L,
∇F (W (l)) = R(l) ◦
(
∇F̂ (Ŵ (l))− (
m∑
s=1
γIsσ˜
(l)
s ) + υβ̂
(l)
)
= R(l) ◦
(
∇F̂ (Ŵ (l))− rT σ̂(l) + υβ̂(l)
)
=
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
∂L̂
∂Ŵ (l)
(29)
where σ̂(l) =
∑K
k=1
Nk
N σ̂
(l)
k .
In what follows, we prove the correctness of Eq. (29).
Proof. Before proving the correctness of Eq. (29), we first give
results of Eq. (28) in details. Specifically, for l = 1, 2, . . . , L,
∇F̂ (Ŵ (l)) =
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
∇F̂k(Ŵ (l))
=
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
∂L̂
∂Ŵ (l)
+ 0nl×nl−1
=
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
∂L̂
∂Ŵ (l)
.
σ̂(l) =
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
σ̂
(l)
k =
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
(
σ
(l)
k + φ
(l)
k
)
=
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
σ
(l)
k + 0nl×nl−1 =
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
σ
(l)
k .
β̂(l) =
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
β̂
(l)
k =
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
(
β
(l)
k + φ
(l)
k
)
=
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
β
(l)
k + 0nl×nl−1 =
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
β
(l)
k .
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Consequently, we can derive that
∇F (W (l)) = R(l) ◦
(
∇F̂ (Ŵ (l))− rT σ̂(l) + υβ̂(l)
)
= R(l) ◦
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
(
∂L̂
∂Ŵ (l)
− rTσ(l)k + υβ(l)k
)
= R(l) ◦
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
(
1
R(l)
◦ ∂L
∂W (l)
+ rTσ
(l)
k −
)
υβ
(l)
k − rTσ(l)k + υβ(l)k
)
=
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
∂L
∂W (l)
.
Note that the above equation holds when the multiplicative
noisy vectors {r(l)}Ll=1, the additive noisy vector ra and a
random coefficient γ for all clients are the same. In other
words, the noisy parameters {Ŵ (l)}Ll=1 sent to all clients are
the same.
2) The case of CE: Similarly, the server computes
∇F̂ (Ŵ (l)) =
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
∇F̂k(Ŵ (l)),
σ˜(l)s =
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
σ˜
(l)
k,s, s = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
β˜(l)s =
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
β˜
(l)
k,s,
ψ˜(l)s =
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
ψ˜
(l)
k,s,
where l = 1, 2, . . . , L. Then, according to Lemma 5, the server
recovers the true aggregated gradients ∇F (W (l)) as follows:
for l = 1, 2, . . . , L,
∇F (W (l)) = R(l) ◦
(
∇F̂ (Ŵ (l))− (
m∑
s=1
γIsσ˜
(l)
s ) +
(
m∑
s=1
γIsξIs β˜
(l)
s )− (
m∑
s=1
ξIsψ˜
(l)
s )
)
= R(l) ◦
(
∇F̂ (Ŵ (l))− rT σ̂(l) +
(rT ◦ ξT )β̂(l) − ξT ψ̂(l)
)
=
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
∂L
∂W (l)
,
where σ̂(l) =
∑K
k=1
Nk
N σ̂
(l)
k , β̂
(l) =
∑K
k=1
Nk
N β̂
(l)
k , and
ψ̂(l) =
∑K
k=1
Nk
N ψ̂
(l)
k .
Finally, based on Eq. (3), the server updates the global model
for the (t+ 1)-th iteration as: for l = 1, 2, . . . , L,
W
(l)
t+1 ←W (l) − η∇F (W (l)).
D. Data Inference
After finishing the model training, the server needs to
send the well-trained model (i.e., model parameters W =
{W (l)}Ll=1) to each client. In order to prevent clients from
knowing the real model W and allow each client to predict
locally, the server still needs to encrypt W . Specifically,
the operations are similar to that in Section III-A, the only
difference is that in the last layer, the server does not adopt the
additive noises ra and γ. Thus, the noisy model parameters
are computed as
Ŵ (l) = R(l) ◦W (l), for 1 ≤ l ≤ L,
where R(l) satisfies that
• For the MLP:
R
(l)
ij =

r
(1)
i , for l = 1;
r
(l)
i /r
(l−1)
j , for 2 ≤ l ≤ L− 1;
1/r
(L−1)
j , for l = L;
where i ∈ [1, nl] and j ∈ [1, nl−1].
• For the CNN:
R
(l)
k,c′,i′,j′ =

r
(l)
k , for l = 1,
r
(l)
k
r
(l,in)
c′
, for 2 ≤ l ≤ L− 1.
where k ∈ [1, cl], c′ ∈ [1, cl−1], i′ ∈ [1, f ] and j′ ∈ [1, f ].
R
(L)
ij = 1/r
(L−1)
bj/(hL−1wL−1)c,
where i ∈ [1, nL] and j ∈ [1, nL−1].
Obviously, without the influence of additive noises ra and γ,
based on Lemmas 1 and 2, it can be verified that the final
prediction is
yˆ(L) = y(L),
which is the true prediction.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Based on design goals, we analyze the security properties of
our scheme in this section. Particularly, our analysis includes
two aspects: the privacy of server-side and the privacy of
client-side.
A. The Privacy of Server-side
As stated in [41], [25], the adversary can infer some
information from the true gradient, and thus the intuitive idea is
to prevent the attacker from obtaining the true gradient. Hence,
we first prove that our method is semantic security against
semi-trusted clients. Then, we show that the prediction can be
protected from leaking to clients during model training.
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1) Confidentiality of model parameters: As introduced in
Section III-A, in order to prevent the semi-trusted clients from
obtaining the true gradient, the server encrypts the global
model before distributing. After getting the encrypted global
model Ŵ = {Ŵ (l)}Ll=1, clients perform forward propagation
and backward propagation to compute local noisy gradients.
We can observe that clients perform linear and derivative
operations based on the encrypted global model, which would
not affect the security of the gradient, and thus the crux is the
security of Ŵ = {Ŵ (l)}Ll=1. Next, we show that our method
is semantically secure. Particularly, the server randomly selects
different private keys for different iterations, i.e., the private
key is one-time used, and thus we first would like to review
the definition of semantic security for a one-time key [35], [5].
Definition 2. For a cipher E = (E,D), where E and D are
encryption and decryption operations, respectively. Consider
an adversary A that selects two messages m0 and m1 with the
same length from the message space. The challenger then flips
a fair binary coin b, encrypts one of the messages E(k,mb)
using a random k selected from the key space and sends
it back to A. A now guesses b∗ ∈ {0, 1} that yielded the
particular encryption. Let Z0 be the event where b = 0 and
A guesses b∗ = 1 and let Z1 be the event where b = 1 and
A guesses b∗ = 1. Then, a cipher E is semantically secure if
the advantage
AddSS(A,E) = |Pr(Z0)− Pr(Z1)|
is negligible for all efficient adversaries.
Lemma 6. Our one-time-used-key encryption method is se-
mantically secure.
Proof. In this part, we take the case of MLP as an example,
and the case of CNN is similar to MLP.
• The polynomial-time adversary A chooses two messages
W0 = {W (l)0 }Ll=1 and W1 = {W (l)1 }Ll=1, of equal length,
and gives these to an encryption oracle.
• The encryption oracle generates a random key sk =
({r(l)}Ll=1,γ) such that r(l) ∈ Rnl>0 and γ ∈ RnL ,
along with random b = {0, 1}, and encrypts the message
Wb = {W (l)b }Ll=1 using the key sk:
Ŵb
(l)
=
{
R(l) ◦W (l)b , for 1 ≤ l ≤ L− 1;
R(L) ◦W (L)b +Ra, for l = L,
where R(l) ∈ Rnl×nl−1 and Ra ∈ RnL×nL−1 satisfy
R
(l)
ij =

r
(1)
i , when l = 1
r
(l)
i /r
(l−1)
j , when 2 ≤ l ≤ L− 1
1/r
(L−1)
j , when l = L
Raij = γi · ra,i.
• The adversary A is then given the resulting ciphertext
Ŵb = {Ŵb
(l)}Ll=1. Finally, A outputs a guess b∗ ∈ {0, 1}.
Since the private key sk is randomly selected from positive real
space, Ŵ0 and Ŵ1 are also uniformly random, which means
that the distributions Ŵ0 and Ŵ1 are identically distributed (no
algorithm can distinguish them). Then Z0 and Z1 are identical
events and so
AddSS(A, our method) = |Pr(Z0)− Pr(Z1)| = 0,
which is negligible for all adversaries.
2) Confidentiality of the true prediction for classification
tasks: As shown in Section III-A, the client computes the
noisy prediction vector yˆ(L) as y(L) +αγ ◦ ra, where y(L) is
the true prediction vector. The parameter α and noisy vector
ra are known to the client, while γ is chosen by the server
randomly which is unknown to the client. Recall that there
exists a partition unionsqms=1{Is} of {1, 2, . . . , nL}, such that for any
i, j in the same Is satisfy that γi = γj . The trade-off between
the privacy-preservation of the true prediction and the extra
computation and communication cost (which is related to m)
is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 7. For classification tasks, if m = 1, the probability
that the clients obtain the true prediction is less than 1;
If 2 ≤ m ≤ nL, the probability that the clients obtain the
true prediction is less than or equal to 1/m.
Proof. If m = 1, then γ1 = γ2 = · · · = γnL which is chosen
randomly by the server, and denoted by γ0. Note that yˆ
(L)
i =
y
(L)
i + αγ0ra,i, i = 1, 2, . . . , nL. Since ra,1, ra,2, . . . , ra,nL
are pairwise distinct, the probability that the clients obtain the
true prediction is obviously less than 1.
If m = 2, for 1 ≤ s ≤ m, recall that γIs := γi ( for
i ∈ Is), and let y(L)s′ = maxi∈Is{y(L)i }, for some s′ ∈ Is. Then
max1≤i≤c{y(L)i } = max1≤s≤m{y(L)s′ }. Then the probability
that the clients obtain the true prediction is less than or equal to
the probability that the clients obtain the maximal one among
y
(L)
1′ ,y
(L)
2′ , . . . ,y
(L)
m′ .
• For the case of MSE: The parameters yˆ(L)1′ , yˆ
(L)
2′ , . . . , yˆ
(L)
m′
and α are known to the clients, which satisfy that
yˆ
(L)
1′ = y
(L)
1′ + αγI1ra,1′ ,
yˆ
(L)
2′ = y
(L)
2′ + αγI2ra,2′ ,
...
yˆ
(L)
m′ = y
(L)
m′ + αγImra,m′ .
(30)
Since γI1 ,γI2 , . . . ,γIm are independent randomly chosen
by the server, for any m-tuple (y(L)1′ ,y
(L)
2′ , . . . ,y
(L)
m′ ) ∈
Rm, there always exists an m-tuple (γI1 ,γI2 , . . . ,γIm)
satisfying the Eq. (30). Thus the probability that the clients
obtain the maximal one among y(L)1′ ,y
(L)
2′ , . . . ,y
(L)
m′ is less
than or equal to 1/m.
• For the case of CE: The parameters
yˆ∗1′ , yˆ
∗
2′ , . . . , yˆ
∗
m′ , ξ
′
1′ , ξ
′
2′ , . . . , ξ
′
m′ are also known
to the clients, which satisfy that
yˆ∗s′ =
1
exp(δs′)
· exp(y
(L)
s′ )∑nL
j=1 exp(y
(L)
j )
,
ξ′s′ =
ξs′
1− exp(δs′) ,
(31)
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for all s = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Since γI1 ,γI2 , . . . ,γIm ,
δ1′ , δ2′ , . . . , δm′ , ξ1′ , ξ2′ , . . . , ξm′ are inde-
pendent randomly chosen by the server,
for any m-tuple (y(L)1′ ,y
(L)
2′ , . . . ,y
(L)
m′ ) ∈
Rm, there always exists an 3m-tuple
(γI1 ,γI2 , . . . ,γIm , δ1′ , δ2′ , . . . , δm′ , ξ1′ , ξ2′ , . . . , ξm′)
simultaneously satisfying the Eq. (30) and Eq. (31). Thus
the probability that the clients obtain the maximal one
among y(L)1′ ,y
(L)
2′ , . . . ,y
(L)
m′ is also less than or equal to
1/m.
According to Lemma 7, the clients cannot obtain the true
prediction.
B. The Privacy of Client-side
In federated learning, the basic requirement is to protect the
training data of each client (i.e., the privacy of client-side),
and thus our method also needs to satisfy this requirement. As
stated in Section II-C2, the server needs to recover the accurate
model to ensure model accuracy. Hence, we ensure that the
server can only get the aggregated gradients rather than the
gradients of each client.
Lemma 8. The proposed local gradients perturbation can
ensure that the probability of getting the true gradients of each
client is negligible for the semi-trusted server.
Proof. Similar to [3], because the random number matrices
{φ(l)1 ,φ(l)2 , . . . ,φ(l)K }Ll=1 that clients add are uniformly sampled
from the real space, the value ∇F̂k(Ŵ (l)) (see Eq. (27))
appears uniformly random to the server. Hence, there exist
infinite pairs (( ∂L̂
∂Ŵ (l)
)k,φ
(l)
k ) satisfying the given ∇F̂k(Ŵ (l)).
That is, the probability of identifying the correct solution from
an infinite number of solutions satisfying ∇F̂k(Ŵ (l)) is almost
zero. Therefore, the server cannot identify the noisy gradients
( ∂L̂
∂Ŵ (l)
)k of the k-th client. Similarly, the server also cannot
identify individual additional noisy terms {σ(l)k ,β(l)k }.
Consequently, it is almost impossible for the server to obtain
the true gradients of each client, let alone the local training
data. Note that in the cross-silo FL [15], clients are different
organizations (e.g. medical or financial), the network connection
is relatively stable and the network bandwidth is relatively large.
Thus, we can neglect the stragglers that cannot return the model
updates to the server.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We empirically evaluate our method on real-world datasets,
from two different perspectives: effectiveness (i.e., how well
our algorithm perform on these datasets) and efficiency (i.e.,
how much extra computation and communication cost our
method spends).
A. Experimental Setup
We implement our methods based on the native network
layer in Pytorch [27] running on single Tesla M40 GPU. We
adopt FedAvg [22] as the baseline algorithm for comparison. In
all experiments, the training epochs and the batch-size of each
client are set to be 200 and 32, respectively. Unless specified
otherwise, the number of private key partition m is set to 1
for the experiments on effectiveness, since different choice
of m has little impact on the decryption for server. For the
efficiency experiments, we will have a detailed discussion on
the impact of m.
Datasets and Metrics. We evaluate our method on three
privacy-sensitive datasets covering both the bank and medical
scenarios and one image dataset.
• UCI Bank Marketing Dataset (UBMD) [24] is related
to direct marketing campaigns of a Portuguese banking
institution and aims to predict the possibility of clients
for subscribing deposits. It contains 41188 instances of 17
dimensional bank data. Following conventional practise,
we split the dataset into training/validation/test sets by
8:1:1. We adopt MSE as the evaluation metric.
• APTOS Blindness Detection (ABD) 2 consists of 3.6k
training and 1.9k test datasets of retina images for predict-
ing the severity of diabetic retinopathy. For preprocessing,
we center-crop images and resize them into size of 64×64.
We also use MSE as the evaluation metric.
• Lesion Disease Classification (LDC) [32] [7] provides
8k training and 2k test skin images for the classification
of lesion disease. We downsample the images into 64×64
and adopt classification accuracy as the evaluation metric.
• CIFAR-100 [17] contains 60000 color images of size 32
× 32 divided into 100 classes, each of which contains 600
images. Following conventional practise, the dataset is
divided into 50000 training images and 10000 test images.
B. Experiments on regression and classification
We evaluate the training accuracy of our algorithm against
native FedAvg on both regression and classification tasks.
Besides, we present the computation and communication
overhead of the basic building blocks in our method.
1) Regression: We evaluate the performance of our method
on regression tasks with UBMD and LDC. For a more
comprehensive comparison, we train ResNet20 and MLP with
3, 5 and 7 layers on ABD and UBMD, respectively. We also
evaluate the performance for k = 1, 5, 10 clients on both
datasets. Table I shows the MSE for the final converged model
on testsets. From the table, the accuracy of our method elegantly
aligns with that of FedAvg under various settings, which verifies
our derivation in Section III. Note that some operations (e.g.,
dividing by random vectors) may cause precision errors, but
the corresponding effects are negligible.
2) Classification: In this section, we evaluate our method for
the classification task with ResNet20, ResNet32 and ResNet56
models on the LDC dataset. Both FedAvg and our method
2https://www.kaggle.com/c/aptos2019-blindness-detection
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TABLE I: MSE Result for regression tasks. Lower MSE means
better performance.
k = 1 k = 5 k = 10
UBMD
FedAvg
MLP-3 0.059 0.079 0.097
MLP-5 0.059 0.079 0.100
MLP-7 0.058 0.086 0.113
Ours
MLP-3 0.060 0.078 0.097
MLP-5 0.059 0.077 0.101
MLP-7 0.059 0.082 0.114
ABD FedAvg ResNet20 0.048 0.085 0.117Ours ResNet20 0.047 0.088 0.114
adopt cross entropy as the loss function. The accuracy of
converged models on testsets is shown in Table II. Similar to
regression tasks, the accuracy of our method elegantly aligns
with FedAvg.
TABLE II: Accuracy result for classification task.
k = 1 k = 5 k = 10
LDC
FedAvg
ResNet20 69.42 69.27 69.14
ResNet32 70.96 70.78 70.64
ResNet56 72.69 71.61 71.10
Ours
ResNet20 69.33 69.29 69.22
ResNet32 71.05 70.84 70.62
ResNet56 72.83 71.55 71.23
C. Experiments on local gradient perturbation mechanism
1) Effectiveness Verification: In this section, we evaluate the
performance of our method with local gradient perturbation
mechanism, i.e., both the training iterates from the server and
local model updates from the clients will be protected. The
experiments are conducted on CIFAR-100. We adopt ResNet20
as the base model and MSE as the loss function. We show
the accuracy of converged models on testsets with 1, 5, 10
clients respectively in Table III. As can be seen from the table,
our result still aligns well with that of FedAvg, even with the
gradient perturbation mechanism. This verify the effectiveness
our client-side privacy protection method.
TABLE III: Accuracy on CIFAR-100 for ResNet20.
k = 1/5/10
FedAvg 72.35 / 71.68 / 71.44
Ours 72.22 / 71.77 / 71.62
2) Security Verification: Recent research, dubbed DLG [41],
found that training data may be recovered from the local
gradient information returned from the clients in federated
learning. Differential privacy (DP) methods, by adding noise
on gradients before sharing, are shown to be able to prevent
the privacy leakage at the cost of model accuracy. Therefore,
we compare our method with DP from the following two
aspects: (converged) model accuracy and dependability effect.
More specifically, we train ResNet20 models in CIFAR-100
on 5 clients with our gradient perturbation mechanism and
DP mechanism (of different levels of Guassian noises with
variance ranging from 10−4 to 10−1), respectively. [41] tries
to reconstruct the input image by minimizing the L2 difference
between the gradient corresponding to the original input and
the one corresponding to the reconstructed input. Therefore,
lower L2 difference means the reconstructed input is closer
to the original one, i.e., the defendability is worse. Here, we
adopt the same metric for the evaluation of defendability as in
[41]. The results are shown in Table IV.
TABLE IV: Accuracy and defense results on CIFAR-100 of
our method against DLG attack, compared with DP method of
various level of Guassian noise.
DP-10−4 DP-10−3 DP-10−2 DP-10−1 Our method
Accuracy 72.19 69.87 43.55 1.12 72.22
Defendability 0.017 0.092 0.217 0.238 0.235
From the table, we can see that our gradient perturbation
mechanism achieves comparable accuracy with the DP of
lowest level of noise (10−4), while having the same level
of defendability (10−1) as DP of highest level of noise. This
comes from the secret sharing nature of our method, and the
added perturbation can be elegantly cancelled out with the
server-side gradient aggregation. We also provide visualization
of reconstructed result on a randomly sampled image from the
testset of CIFAR-100 in Fig. 3.
DP-10 4 DP-10 3 DP-10 2 DP-10 1 Our method
Fig. 3: Reconstructed results of DLG against different defenses.
D. Experiments of convergence
The main purpose of our method is to enable clients to
train over encrypted models without accuracy loss. In this
section, we further empirically prove this claim by comparing
the convergence process of our method against the FedAvg [22].
Specifically, we train ResNet20 and ResNet32 [11] models on
Lesion Disease Classification dataset [32] [7] for 200 epoches
for our method and FedAvg, respectively. For the fairness of
comparison, we use different random seeds for each run, and set
the seeds for our method and FedAvg to be the same. Then we
demonstrate the mean and standard deviation of test accuracy
after each epoch in Fig. 4. As shown in the figure, overall,
the convergence process of our method and FedAvg is almost
exactly consistent. Although the curves of our method and the
FedAvg may be noisy in the early stage, they tend to stabilize
and converge to similar results as the training proceeds.
E. Communication and Computation
We dive into each of the components of our method and
compare computational and communication overheads of our
method with FedAvg. The experiments are conducted on
ResNet56 with an input size of 224× 224, a batch size of 32
and iteration number of 250. Note that the number of private
key partition m only linearly affects the number of addition,
which is negligible compared to the computational cost of other
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Fig. 4: Training curves for our method and FedAvg. The first
and second rows demonstrate the results for ResNet20 and
ResNet32 with 1, 5 and 10 clients respectively. The error bars
stand for standard deviation and are shown every 5 epochs.
Each experiment is repeated 5 times. Please note that it is best
to view in color.
operations. Therefore, m is set as 1 for all the experiments
and we will discuss the impact of m on communication cost
in more details.
Table V shows the comparison of computational cost for our
method and FedAvg, where PP, LFP, LBP, and MU stands
for parameter perturbation, local forward propagation, local
backward propagation and model update, respectively. From
the table, we can see compared to FedAvg, the computational
cost of our method has approximately doubled, which is mainly
caused by the backward propagation on client side (i.e., 91.08 to
228.06 seconds). This is due to the computation of additional
information, i.e. σ and β, for noisy gradient recovery. The
increased cost of our method on the server side is basically
negligible, indicating the server can afford the FL as usual.
TABLE V: Computational overhead of our method (Seconds).
PP LFP LBP MU Total
FedAvg Client 0 2.19 88.89 0 91.08Server 0 0 0 89.11 89.11
Ours Client 0 2.20 225.86 0 228.06Server 3.66 0 0 92.39 96.05
The communication overhead is mainly affected by m.
Specifically, the communication overhead mainly includes two
interactions: the server sends noisy parameters Ŵ = {Ŵ (l)}Ll=1
together with the c-dimensional noisy vector ra to clients
and each client returns local noisy gradients {∇Ŵ}Ll=1 to-
gether with extra noisy items {σ(l),β(l)}Ll=1 for MSE and
{σ(l),β(l),ψ(l)}Ll=1 for CE. Obviously, compared to FedAvg,
the added communication costs are ra and the noisy terms,
where the cost of ra can be negligible. Therefore, theoretical
analysis shows that the additional communication is O(2m|W |)
for MSE and O(3m|W |) for CE, where |W | is the size of
model parameters. The experiments also confirm our theoretical
results. For example, when m = 1, both the server-to-
client and client-to-server communication overheads in FedAvg
are 0.85 MB, while the server-to-client and client-to-server
communication overheads in our method are 0.85 MB and 2.55
MB, respectively.
In summary, in order to achieve the privacy preservation,
we bring about certain amount of extra computational and
communication costs. Nonetheless, we try the best to decrease
the additional cost and keep it in constant level without
decreasing the model accuracy compared to the original FL.
VI. RELATED WORK
Federated learning was formally introduced by Google in
2016 [16] to address the data privacy in machine learning. Then,
FedAvg [22] and its theoretical research [20] were introduced
to implement and flourish FL. After that, many improvements
and variants of FedAvg were deployed to deal with statistical
challenges [31], [10], [23], communication challenges [1], [40],
[6] and privacy issues[4], [36], [19], [3]. Considering the
potential value of federal learning, many promising applications,
such as healthcare [19], [37], virtual keyboard prediction [29],
[39] and vehicle-to-vehicle communication [30], have tried to
adopt FL as an innovative mechanism to train global model
from multiple parties with privacy-preserving property.
Recently, some summary works on FL have been presented
[8], [38], [18], [15]. Specifically, Dai et al. [8] provided an
overview of the architecture and optimization approach for
federated data analysis. Yang et al. [38] identified architec-
tures for the FL framework and summarized general privacy-
preserving techniques that can be applied to FL. Li et al.
[18] provided a broad overview of current approaches and
outlined several directions of future work of FL. Peter et al. [15]
outlined the classification of FL and discussed recent advances
and presented an extensive collection of open problems and
challenges.
From the above, it is still a big challenge to effectively
protect the intermediate iterates during the training phase and
the final model parameters in FL [15].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a practical and bilateral privacy-
preserving federated learning scheme, which aims to protect
model iterates and final model parameters from disclosing. We
introduce an efficient privacy-preserving technique to encrypt
model iterates and final model parameters. This technique
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allows clients to train the updated model under noisy current
model, and more importantly, ensures only the server can
eliminate the noise to get accurate results. Security analysis
shows the high security of our method under the honest but
curious security setting. Besides, experiments conducted on
real data also demonstrate the practical performance of our
method.
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